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Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence
FRANK B. CROSS*
Judicial independence, properly understood as the judiciary's freedom from
control by other branches of government, is not entirely advantageous. Like any
other government institution, the judiciary may be irresponsible if it is not
checked and held accountable. The experience with the Iranian judiciary amply
demonstrates this effect. Ideally, the judiciary will have some measure of
independence with some accountability, and the trick is getting the right balance
between the two. This article contends that the United States has that balance
roughly correct, which is a strength of our government. One key element in the
balance is judicial selection, and this article finds that elected state judiciaries
appear to be more independent than those state judiciaries that are appointed
with more assured tenure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial independence is often treated as if it were an unalloyed good, to be
furthered insofar as practically possible. In the traditional telling, an independent
judiciary is regarded as if it were the font of justice, the rule of law and individual
rights, if not the font of all good things. Such worship of judicial independence is
not sustainable, theoretically or empirically. Indeed, the concept of judicial
independence potentially flies in the face of our fundamental constitutional
concept of checks and balances. While there is no doubt that a measure of judicial
independence is a good thing, such independence must be kept in balance with
judicial accountability. Increased judicial independence is not always better.'
This article begins with a discussion of the concept of judicial independence.
Too often such independence has been interpreted in a facile manner and equated
with "all good things." To be of any practical policy value, the concept must be
more precisely defined, and I define it as freedom from control or pressure by the
other political branches of government.2 Once the nature of judicial independence
is understood, the second section of this article explores the implications of
judicial independence by examining Iran's uniquely independent judiciary. Iran's
experience suggests that total judicial independence is not necessarily good.
The third section of this article discusses the balance between independence
and accountability in U.S. courts. U.S. judges have a fair measure of
* Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, McCombs School of
Business, University of Texas; Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School.
I For a very brief discussion of the importance of this balancing, see Scott H. Bice,
Foreword, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 311 (1999).
2 There are other, equally reasonable definitions of judicial independence. It might be
defined as freedom from the pressures imposed by popular will, though this is more difficult to
identify and operationalize. It should not be conflated with the rule of law, which is an
aspiration and not a political arrangement.
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independence. This is evidenced through analysis of the legal protections of the
judiciary, anecdotal evidence, and rigorous statistical measures of judicial
decision-making. However, judicial independence in this nation is far from
absolute. The judiciary remains accountable to the other branches of government
and cannot stray too far from their preferences. The Congress has numerous tools
at its disposal to discipline or constrain the judiciary, and analysis of case law
reveals that judges sometimes heed that power in their decisions. Studies of
judicial decision-making demonstrate the judiciary's concern for the attitudes of
Congress and the President.
The fourth section of this article presents a brief empirical study on decision-
making in state courts. The study evaluates the effect of judicial selection systems
on judicial activism, as expressed in decisions declaring statutes unconstitutional.
Such activism is surely evidence of judicial independence. I find that judges
selected by the "merit plan" are significantly less prone to activism than those
chosen through other methods, and that elected judges are the most activist. I also
find that state judges-under any selection system-are most assertive when
members of the elected branches of the state's political system are relatively less
accountable due to the influence of special interests or the lack of effective
competition for office.
II. THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Understanding the concept of judicial independence requires defining from
whom judges are to be independent. While judicial independence is a dynamic
concept that may be defined in different ways, it is generally referred to as a
shorthand for the judiciary's independence from the executive and legislative
branches of government. 3 The foundation ofjudicial independence is that "judges
free of congressional and executive control will be in a position to determine
whether the assertion of power against the citizen is consistent with law ....-4
This is the Supreme Court's essential understanding of the phrase.5 At a
minimum, it means that judges cannot be punished physically or economically for
the content of the decisions they reach. Consequently, judges need not fear
3 This may be conflated with the distinct concept of judicial independence from the
popular will. We may wish judges to be independent of public opinion out of fear for the
protection of individual rights and the tyranny of the majority. While the other branches of the
U.S. government are popularly elected and therefore presumably aligned with the popular will,
this connection is an imperfect one.
4 Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article 111, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 268 (1990) (emphasis added).
5 See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980) (referring to "judges who are free
from potential domination by other branches of government"). Judge Kaufman similarly
emphasized that the decisions ofjudges must be "free from undue interference by the President




deciding cases on their merits, even when contrary to the interests or desires of the
other branches of government. Thus, other branches of government have no
power over case outcomes. Judicial independence thereby frees judges to apply
the rule of law and do justice in individual cases.6
Judicial independence is an instrumental means to an end, not an end in
itself.7 The concept is not attractive because it makes judges happy, but because it
protects against other branches forcing unfair judicial outcomes, grounded in self-
interest or ideological fervor. Justice Breyer has thus noted that the "question of
judicial independence revolves around the theme of how to assure that judges
decide according to law, rather than according to their own whims or to the will
of the political branches of government. ' 8 Freed from threats from the other
branches, judges may be better able to render dispassionate judgments and apply
the law fairly to the facts.9 They are to be principled decisionmakers impartially
deciding cases according to the rule of law. It is against this standard that judicial
independence must be measured, and there is no intrinsic guarantee that
independence will further the standard.
6 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
315, 316 (1999) (describing judicial independence as interwoven with the rule of law); A.E.
Dick Howard, Judicial Independence in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 89, 89 (Peter H. Russell & David
O'Brien eds. 2001) (claiming that "[e]ssential to the rule of law is the creation and maintenance
of an independent judiciary"); John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 366 (1999) (stating that "a high
degree of judicial independence seems a necessary condition for the maintenance of the rule of
law"). Ferejohn is presumably correct that a degree of judicial independence is a necessary
condition for maintenance of the rule of law, but it is not a sufficient condition. Further, too
much independence may even undermine that goal.
7 See, e.g., Peter H. Russell, Toward a General Theory of Judicial Independence, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 1, 3 (stressing that
judicial independence is not an end in itself and must be justified because it is "thought to serve
some important objective, to contribute to some desirable state of affairs").
8 Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 989,
989 (1996). There are several different theories with which to define judicial independence,
including the "legalist" (considering the formal legal protections of independence), the
"behavioralist" (considering the degree to which judges actually act independently), the
"culturalist" (considering judges' internal estimate of their independence), and the "careerist"
(considering the determinants of appointment and promotion). Todd Foglesong, The Dynamics
of Judicial (In)dependence in Russia, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY,
supra note 6, at 62, 68. Breyer implicitly adopts the behavioralist definition, which I likewise
find to be the most useful approach to measuring judicial independence.
9 See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical
and Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COmp. L. 605, 608 (1996) (reporting that 'Judicial
independence is related to the notion of conflict resolution by a 'neutral third;' in other words,
by someone who can be trusted to settle controversies after considering only the facts and their
relation to relevant laws").
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One potential problem with judicial independence is that judges may have
their own self-interests and ideological fervor. An independent, unchecked
judiciary may simply decide cases according to its own whims and predilections,
rather than according to the rule of law. 10 For example, because of the great
independence of the federal life-tenured judiciary, many political scientists
believe that they are more ideological in their decisions than elected legislators or
executives.' 1 Judges may allow corruption and bribery to influence their
decisions.12 They may even be lazy and decide poorly, given the lack of
oversight. In these circumstances, the means (independent judiciary) does not
advance the end (rule of law). We cannot rely entirely upon judicial self-
discipline and restraint to avoid these circumstances.
There is nothing intrinsic in judges that causes them to favor, say, rule-of-law
impartiality and the freedoms recognized in the Bill of Rights. Saintliness is not a
historic precondition to becoming a judge, nor does the process of doffing judicial
robes magically make one saintly. There are surely temptations not to apply the
neutral rule of law. Given the absence of an), threat of removal, "we should
expect to see the decisions of judges heavily influenced by the intellectual
orientation and political inclinations that they brought with them to the bench in
the first place."'1 3 In addition to internal political desires, there may even be
external pressures to this effect. Paul Carrington observed that those calling for
judicial self-restraint "would have Justices eschew fame, the adoration of the
media and the academy, and even 'greatness' to settle for the modest facelessness
of drones." 14 There is little reason to expect that a wholly independent,
10 Even an honest, well-meaning, independent judiciary may present some problems.
Clearly, there are close cases, not governed by the traditional materials of the law. In such cases,
judges concededly must exercise their values. From a democratic perspective, it is unclear why
the values of such judges should trump the values of the public or the more accountable
branches of the government.
11 See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and he New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251, 279 (1997).
12 While the Italian judiciary is currently renowned for exposing political corruption, it
was actually integrally involved in that corruption for some time. See Donatella Della Porta, A
Judges Revolution? Political Corruption and the Judiciary in Italy, 39 EUROP. J. POL. REs. 1, 6
(2001) (noting that hundreds ofjudges were "under investigation for crimes such as corruption,
abuse of power, and even participation in Mafia-type associations"). The country's experience
demonstrated that "[i]nstitutional independence is ... not sufficient to promote an effective
commitment of the judiciary against political corruption." Id. at 2. When the Italian judges did
embark on a campaign against political corruption, it was with the strong support of public
opinion and a major political party. Id. at 15-16.
13 Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 838.
14 Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the
Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 406 (1999).
[Vol. 64:195
THOUGHTS ON GOLDILOCKS
unaccountable judiciary would appropriately restrain itself and sincerely seek to
apply neutral legal principles to the cases they decide.
If independent judges have more freedom to exercise their own preferences,
plus an incentive to do so, we must recognize that those preferences may not
involve the protection of individual rights or the rule of law, which is our desired
end. The judicial preferences may be arbitrary and antidemocratic. We must
worry about checking the judiciary, just as it checks the other branches. These
checks, rather than absolute independence, are more likely to enhance the rule of
law.15 Because the federal judiciary need not run for reelection, we must
particularly worry about the extent of its independence.
III. CONSIDERING A TRULY INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
The Iranian experience offers itself as a case study in true judicial
independence. 16 The judicial branch in Iran may be the most independent of any
nation. Iran adopted a new constitution in 1979, following the overthrow of the
Shah. The constitution provided for separation of powers with an independent
judiciary and placed the country's courts within its Ministry of Justice. The High
Judicial Council is the highest court, with considerable authority over the law; its
members are chosen by the Council of Guardians. 17 Half the members of the
Council and the president of the Supreme Court are appointed, not by elected
leaders, but by the country's religious leader. Under the constitution, Islamic
governance occurs more through the judiciary than through the other branches.
The constitution was revised in 1989, but the independent power of the
judiciary was not altered. The Council of Guardians was replaced with the Head
of the Judiciary, who is to establish a judicial organization for the implementation
of Islamic law.18 The Head of the Judiciary is appointed for a five year term by
15 See David Scott Yamanishi, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law: The
Ineffectiveness of Judicial Independence Alone as a Path to Development 19 (Sept. 2, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (suggesting that "the proper balancing of
overlapping powers between governmental bodies whose actions are generally viewed as
legitimate is the essence of rule of law").
167Te summary in the following two paragraphs is drawn from Farshad Malekahmadi,
The Sociological Intersection of Religion, Law and Politics in Iran: Judicial Review and
Political Control in the Islamic Republic (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State
University of New York) (on file with author) and LAWYERS COMMnrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN (1993).
17 LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 12-14. The Council is a
unique institution that is difficult to categorize. However, its supervision of the judicial system
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the religious Leader of the Islamic Republic but cannot be removed by the
executive or legislative branches.19
The judiciary in Iran, supervised solely by the Council of Guardians, is
charged with ensuring that the nation's law conforms to shari'a-Islamic
religious law. The Council of Guardians is an entity like no other in the world,
including clerics and representing a true hierocracy.20 The religious law, as
defined and applied by the Council and its subsidiary courts, has the power to
trump decisions of the other branches. All laws are reviewed against the standard
of fidelity to Islam, and the Council has the authority to strike down laws or
executive edicts.21 The Council also has the authority to supervise elections and
disqualify candidates. This gives considerable authority to the judiciary. It is as if,
in the West, the common law could override legislation and executive decisions,
as well as governing the interpretation of the Constitution.22 The expansive
governmental power of the courts in Iran was combined with formal recognition
of their independence from the other branches. In contrast to most other nations,
where new judges are appointed by the legislature or executive, the Head of the
Judiciary has the power to appoint and promote judges.23 The Iranian judiciary is
not just formally independent, it is functionally as independent as any in the
world. Judges are not only "constitutionally untouchable," they are also regarded
as "beyond criticism." 24
The power and independence of Iranian courts have come under attack
recently. Iran's President Khatami has assailed his rivals, especially in the
judiciary, as "narrow-minded monopolists and totalitarianists. '25 Ayatollah Ali
19Id. at 17.
20 While the Council as created had six clerics and six lay members, the clerics
dominated the group. Only they may vote on whether a law is contrary to Islam.
21 See Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Foreword.- Antidiscrimination
and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 80, 112 n.92 (1991).
22 See S.H. Amin, The Legal System oflran, in 5 MODERN LEGAL SYsTEMs CYCLOPEDIA
5.80.6 (Kenneth Robert Redden ed., 1990) (discussing how after the 1979 Constitution, the
judiciary routinely considered legislation to be invalid).
23 The Head of the Judiciary also has the power to dismiss judges. See LAWYERS
COMMrTrEE FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 17. While this power clearly compromises
the independence of individual judges, who may be removed for their decisions, it does not
reduce the independence of the judicial branch. See id. at 20-24 (addressing the nature of this
dependence). See Breyer, supra note 8, at 990 (noting that the internal judicial disciplinary
system is "a manifestation of the independence of the judicial branch, rather than a limitation
upon it"); Burbank, supra note 6, at 340-49 (describing how judicial independence relates to an
institution and not individual judges).
24 Irreconcilable Differences in Iran Overshadow Khatami's Second Term, Deutsche
Presse-Agentur, Aug. 9, 2001, LEXIS, News & Business, Wire Service Stories File.
25 John Ward Anderson, Iran's Reformist President Attacks Conservative Rivals, WASH.
POST, Feb. 15, 2001, at A17 (citation omitted).
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Khamenei objected to the attack, charging Khatami with "weakening the
judiciary." 26 The legislative body even tried to cut the budget for the Council in
order to retaliate against its decisions, but failed.27 The facts present a classic
battle between the elected branches, whose will is being frustrated by an
unelected judiciary independent of their power.28 Under the traditional telling,
judicial independence must be preserved and the attack on the courts fought back.
The Iranian judiciary is "thwarting the democratic will of the people," 29 but this is
the fundamental point of having an independent judiciary. The actions of that
judiciary, though, require more scrutiny.
President Khatami was reelected with 77% of the vote and is dedicated to
expanding democracy, personal freedoms, and civil liberties.30 Conservatives
have used their control of institutions such as the judiciary to wage a
counterattack on the President's agenda. The Council of Guardians vetoed "most
of the political and social changes proposed by Khatami and approved by
parliament in his first term. '31 The judiciary has "clos[ed] [forty] newspapers and
magazines and arrest[ed] scores of reformist journalists, students and other
political activists."'32 When the legislature sought to protect freedom of the press,
"Tehran's top judge, Abbas Ali Alizadeh," invoked judicial independence and
said that the legislative "body had no right to interfere in judicial affairs." 33 The
judiciary has readily sacrificed fair judicial processes in the interests of religious
conformity.34 A reformist legislator was jailed for criticizing the courts.35 In Iran,
an independent judicial branch is flexing its powers so as to undermine
democracy and personal liberty and has become one of the "main tools of
oppression" in the nation.36
26 Id.
27 John Ward Anderson, Dispute Delays Inauguration of Iran's Reformist President;
Conservative Ayatollah Intervenes, but Khatami Retains Power, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001, at
A18.
28 See John Ward Anderson, Islamic Democracy's Power Politics: As Iran 's Election
Nears, Key Issue Is Accountability-to the Public or to God?, WASH. POST, May 26, 2001, at
A20 (describing clash between liberal elected branches and conservative institutions including
judiciary).
2 9 Id.
30 See John Ward Anderson, Iran's Cultural Backlash: Public Floggings Used as Tool
Against Reform, WASH. POST, Aug. 16,2001, at Al; Anderson, supra note 27.
31 Anderson, supra note 27.
32 Anderson, supra note 28.
33 Id.
34 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 16, at 25-26.
35 Nazila Fathi, Iran's Judiciary Sends Moderate Member of Parliament to Prison, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at Al l.
3 6 CENTRE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS, ATTACKS ON JUSTICE: THE
HARASSMENT AND PERSECUTION OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 204 (10th ed. 1999).
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The questionable actions of the Iranian judiciary cannot be blamed upon the
Islamic religion. Like all faiths, Islamic tenets may be interpreted in various ways,
and the Qur'an did not inevitably compel the decisions of Iranian courts. Rather,
the judiciary, freed from accountability to the public or other branches, has seized
the power to impose its ideology upon society. While Iranian judges are
furthering the cause of the conservative clerics, this apparently is their idea of how
best to serve as a judge. In this case, judicial independence seems excessive and
unwise. While Iran is by far the most extreme case of excessive judicial
independence, it is not alone-the German judiciary has been vigorously
criticized for excessive, undemocratic independence.37
IV. THE BALANCE OF INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The United States does not have a truly and wholly independent judiciary,
which is probably a good thing, as the Iranian experience suggests. Judges in this
nation have a large measure of independence but are still constrained. Americans
often boast of our judicial independence. Formalistically, the judiciary does have
a significant measure of independence. The federal judiciary is life-tenured, and
Congress may not reduce its compensation. However, our judicial branch does
not have the sort of total independence found in a nation like Iran. In this section,
I review the balance of independence and accountability that characterizes the
United States judiciary.
Lawyers and legal academics may be somewhat na've about judicial
independence, assuming its presence and virtues and rationalizing away evidence
to the contrary. Political scientists, by contrast,, may be quite cynical about the
concept, claiming that judicial independence is no more than a myth.38 The truth
is somewhere in between, as our judiciary has a measure of independence but is
not entirely unaccountable to the legislative and executive branches. The relative
degree of judicial independence is a descriptive measure that should be settled by
accepted tools for finding truth, which may include examples but should focus on
more rigorous statistical examination of judicial behavior.
37 See Donald P. Kommers, Autonomy vs. Accountability, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN
THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 131, 146 (noting that critics have greeted German
judicial independence with "devastating scorn," attacking judges "for their arrogance, their
conservatism, their passivity, their insularity, and even their lack of social consciousness").
38 See Burbank, supra note 6, at 326 (describing the position); Gerald N. Rosenberg,
Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 394 (1992)
(declaring that the "hypothesis ofjudicial independence must be rejected").
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A. Evidence of Independence
Formalistic guarantees of judicial independence do not demonstrate that the
judiciary is in fact independent, 39 though they serve as evidence of this fact. In
reality, judges in this nation generally feel free and independent, and able to
decide cases as they believe appropriate. Studies of the federal judiciary
demonstrate that it has some obvious independence and does not feel too
constrained by the political branches of the government. While independence can
be difficult to demonstrate directly, empirical evidence can shed light on its
existence.
Ideological judging is a sign of independence-if judges were not
independent, they would not feel free to exercise their values but would hew to
the ideologies of the other branches. 40 Although such political voting by judges
may seem contrary to their responsibility and the rule of law, it also evidences
their relative independence. Studies of judicial decision-making provide evidence
of the existence ofjudicial independence, in the form of ideological voting. Much
empirical research has been conducted on the decision-making of the United
States Supreme Court.
An accumulation of the empirical analysis on judicial voting through meta-
analysis confirms the importance of ideology. Dan Pinello identified over one
hundred empirical analyses that considered judicial votes by party of appointing
president and had enough in common that their results could be combined.
41
Virtually every study separately showed a positive association between party and
voting practice. The combined analysis considered over 220,000 judicial votes,
and the judge's party explained 38% of the variance in their votes.42 Clearly,
there is reason to believe that judges feel free to vote their ideological preferences
in a number of cases. That freedom could only come from a measure of
independence.
39 See Larkins, supra note 9, at 615 (reporting that "formal indicators of judicial
independence often did not conform to reality" in the Latin American experience); Howard,
supra note 6, at 94 (noting that a written constitution provides "no assurance of judicial
independence"). Conversely, judicial independence may thrive even in the absence of explicit
constitutional protection. See Russell, supra note 7, at 22 (observing that the judiciary in
countries such as Israel, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Sweden lack constitutional
protection for independence, yet maintain a level comparable to that of nations that have such
protection). In the U.K., the "political culture provides protections for the independence of the
judiciary, which are missing in the law." Robert Stevens, Judicial Independence in England, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 155, 155.
40 See Alex Kozinski, The Many Faces of Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
861, 864 (1998) (declaring that rulings that "reflect the judges' own biases" show that in "a real
sense they were exercising judicial independence").
41 Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-
analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999).
42 Id. at 241.
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Jeff Segal has conducted a major study of judicial decision-making that
concludes that the Supreme Court justices act independently in their voting.43 He
argues theoretically that the judiciary has tools to evade congressional reaction,
including the ability to "manipulate issues strategically. '44 Moreover, he stresses
the difficulties barring congressional control of the judiciary, even should a
majority wish to respond to a decision.45 Segal also conducts an extensive test of
judicial independence, based on the hypothesis that, with a dependent judiciary,
"some justices should switch their votes as the political environment changes." 46
Using several theoretical models about congressional decision-making, he then
demonstrates that this is not the case.47 He concludes that "[t]he federal judiciary
was designed to be independent, so we should not be surprised that in fact it is." 48
The design of Segal's study did not permit him to prove that the judiciary paid no
heed to congressional concerns, 49 but his results demonstrate that justices do not
moderate their decisional outcomes in response to legislative preferences, which
is a significant finding about judicial independence.
These findings should not come as a surprise to those who follow the Court.
It is not difficult to point to particular decisions that demonstrate the
independence of the courts. In Texas v. Johnson,50 the Court narrowly held that
burning the American flag was protected speech. This produced a storm of public
outrage and congressional disapproval, and the legislature "went back and passed
a statute authorizing laws which prohibit the: burning of flags." 51 The issue
returned to the Court and in United States v. Eichman,52 the Court responded to
the legislative expression by saying "We don't care," 53 and reaffirming its earlier
holding.
Perhaps the most dramatic and clear demonstration of judicial independence
came in City of Boerne v. Flores,54 which struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").55 The statute was passed by Congress to
43 Jeffrey A. Segal, Separtion-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 28,42 (1997).
44 Id. at 31.
45 Id. at 31-32 (including the costs associated with legislative action and the existence of
veto points where individual or small groups of congresspersons may block legislative action).
4 6 1d. at35.
47 Id. at 38-43.
4 8 Id. at 42.
49 See Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1437, 1483 (2001).
50 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
51 Kozinski, supra note 40, at 871.
52 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
53 Kozinski, supra note 40, at 871.
54 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
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expand the right of free exercise of religion, in response to the Court's decisions
limiting the scope of the free exercise right.56 RFRA had an enormous amount of
bipartisan support in Congress.57 The decision made clear that the justices would
adhere to their vision of the Constitution, even in the face of a direct challenge
from Congress and the Executive branch. When President Theodore Roosevelt
criticized Oliver Wendell Holmes for a decision, Holmes responded: "Now, Mr.
President, you can go straight to hell."'58 The Court continues to implicitly
respond in this fashion, with decisions such as City of Boerne and Texas v.
Johnson. Clearly, the courts are not slavish followers of the more political
branches.
B. Evidence ofAccountability
Judges in this country are not entirely free and unconstrained. The courts
rarely challenge the decisions of the legislative and executive branches. 59
Congress and the executive may bring a variety of pressures to bear on even the
life-tenured federal judges. Attacks on the judiciary, historically, "inevitably have
been political" and "motivated by disagreement with the substance of judicial
decisions." 60 When other institutions have significantly disagreed with the
substance of judicial decisions, they have taken a variety of measures to attempt
to discipline the judiciary. These powers have some effect on judicial decisions.
The congressional power that is most obvious, yet apparently futile, is the
authority to impeach judges. Although Congress rarely removes judges from
office, threats of impeachment are fairly common. Proponents of the practice
believe that the threats are enough, as "just the process of impeachment serves as
a deterrent. '61 This was the position of Alexander Hamilton, who argued that the
constitutional design meant that a mere threat of impeachment would suffice to
deter judges from abusing their powers.62 Hence, "the low frequency of
5 6 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
57 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,438 (1994).
58 See Roundtable Discussion, Is There a Threat to Judicial Independence in the United
States Today?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 7,26 (1998).
59 See, e.g., Henry J. Abraham, The Pillars and Politics of Judicial Independence in the
United States, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 25, 31
(pointing out that of about 100,000 laws passed by Congress, the Court has declared
unconstitutional fewer than 160, while it has struck down about 1200 state laws).
60 Barry Friedman, "Things Forgotten" in the Debate Over Judicial Independence, 14
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 737, 738 (1998).
61 DAVID BARTON, IMPEACHMENT!: RESTRAINING AN OvERACTIvE JUDICIARY 53 (1996).
62 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 484-485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Hamilton recognized that the judiciary would sometimes contravene legislative
preferences but that such actions would "never be so extensive" because of "the power of
instituting impeachments." Id. at 485.
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impeachment should not be seen as evidence of the security of constitutional
protection, because this may be due as much to judges' reluctance to make
politically controversial decisions as to any display of congressional virtue."63
Judge Dubois has commented: "I do not think anyone is going to get impeached;
but a lot of people are going to be very uncomfortable." 64 Such discomfort surely
can influence decision-making at the margin. 'When Judge Harold Baer came
under fire for suppressing drug evidence and criticizing police practices, he
vacated his ruling upon reconsideration. 65 Other judges have "publicly worried"
about the criticism, and even retired in the face of political criticism. 66
Congress may also influence the federal courts by eliminating their
jurisdiction over certain categories of legal issues. While such jurisdiction-
stripping is not common, the threat of action may suffice, as in the case of
impeachment. There is historical evidence of this effect. In the late 1950s, after
Congress responded to Supreme Court decisions restraining investigation and
prosecution of Communist activity with jurisdiction-stripping threats, the Court
retreated and issued decisions less protective of the civil liberties of subversives. 67
More disciplined empirical research seems to confirm that jurisdiction-stripping
efforts provoke the Court to respond to congressional preferences.68 Congress
need not enact restrictions on jurisdiction because "[a]rousing substantial
opposition to the Court may be enough to dominate it."69 Moreover, there are
instances where Congress has actually legislated just short of jurisdiction-
stripping but nonetheless curbed the Court's powers.70 Congress may also devote
63 John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 353, 358
(1999); see also TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 145 (1999)
(noting that the "effectiveness of political sanctions is not simply the number of times they are
actively and successfully applied," because of the "rule of anticipated reactions" by other
parties).
64 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 58, at 16.
65 See Cross & Nelson, supra note 49, at 1462. (describing pressure on Baer from
Congress and the presidency and his response).
66 Id. at 1463.
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., Stuart Nagel, Court Curbing Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV.
925, 926-27 (1965) (finding that the court retreated in five of the seven historic episodes of
court-curbing efforts); Roger Handberg & Harold F. Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court Reversals,
and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court vs. Congress, 14 LAw & SoC'Y REv. 309 (1980)
(reporting that after curbing proposals were entered in Congress, the Court responded with
decisions favoring the government position).
69 Rosenberg, supra note 38, at 397.
70 When the D.C. Circuit issued a series of rulings favoring criminal defendants, Congress
created a new court system for the District of Columbia that shifted authority away from the
federal courts. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE D.C. Ciacurr COURT 26-
32 (1999) (describing the legislation as a "comprehensive effort to tip the scales of justice in
favor of the police and against mollycoddling courts or judges"). Congress has recently passed
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certain issues to new non-Article IlI courts that permit them greater "political
control" over judicial decision-making. 71 Impeachment and jurisdiction-stripping
threats can be seen as part of a continuing dialogue between the political branches
and the courts, in which the legislature sometimes sends signals that it expects the
courts to heed.72
Congress and the President also have control over the resources of the courts.
While the Constitution provides some salary protection to judges, salary increases
may be withheld. There are no constitutional constraints on appropriations for
support staff, facilities and other necessary resources.
Judge Calabresi has remarked on the significance of these appropriations:
One of the things that has made the judiciary somewhat less independent than it
used to be, not perhaps in a dramatic sense but in a subtle way, is that we are, that
we have come to be, too dependent on the Administrative Office of the Courts,
on fancy offices, on elegant Court houses, on too many law clerks, on a whole lot
of bureaucracy that Congress can take away by not allocating the money to
support it. I have actually had a judge say to me: "Why not take that phrase out
of your opinion, you do not need it, and it might offend the Senate. And you
know how that could affect the judicial budget."'73
Indeed, justices often appear before Congress and plead for additional resources
and additional pay, or a reduced caseload.74 Congress may respond favorably or
critically and that response may depend in large part on the pattern of judicial
decisions.
The desire for promotions is yet another factor that renders judges
accountable to the other institutions of government.75 Because promotions to
higher court levels are dependent on the actions of the President and Congress,
judges have reason to attend to the preferences of these institutions. Judge
Calabresi has noted that "judges want to be promoted," and declared that if he
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214
(1996); the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
110 Stat. 1321 (1996), all of which removed the ability of courts to protect the rights of
defendants or convicted criminals.
71 Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article IlL and the Seventh Amendment, 77 N.C. L.
REv. 1037, 1062(1999).
72 This dialogue also occurs in a variety of less obvious but equally powerful ways. For
example, congressional oversight over judicial operations and expenditures has made the courts
"nervous" and "eager to avoid confrontations." William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison,
Interest Groups and the Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 953,966-67 (1998).
73 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 58, at 27.
74 See Cross & Nelson, supra note 49, at 1466.
75 See generally Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL.
L. REv. 455-56 (1999) (discussing how promotion effects judicial decisions and analyzing the
eighteenth century English judiciary).
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"were to identify the single greatest threat to judicial independence today, it
would be the fact that judges want to move up."'76 There is some empirical
evidence that promotion potential influenced judicial holdings on the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines. 77
Finally, the judiciary is limited by its need for assistance in effectively
implementing the decisions that it reaches. Implementing any social policy,
including those expressed by judicial opinions, requires a variety of resources and
tools that the courts lack. The notions of judicial review and judicial
independence may be "meaningless unless the executive branch is willing and
able to enforce the orders of federal courts."'78 Judges may hesitate to render
opinions strongly contrary to the interests of other institutions because they are
aware that "they lack the power to enforce broad policy decisions." 79 There have
been some "extreme cases of organized opposition" to judicial rulings, such as in
the response to the desegregation cases.80 Steve Griffin has observed that the
"Court is aware that its rulings can be difficult to enforce and may be ignored,"
which "can influence the willingness of the Court to take on certain cases and
may limit the remedies the Court applies in cases it does decide. 81
The culmination of these powers of Congress and the President have the
effect of influencing the judiciary at the expense of its perfect independence.
Judge Joseph Rodriguez, testifying on behalf of the Judicial Conference,
summarized the judiciary's relationship with Congress:
It is safe to say that the happiness, effectiveness, stability and independence of
the federal judiciary depends [sic] to a large extent on Congress. If the legislative
branch is responsive to our needs, we shall remain one of the most durable
legacies of the founders of this nation. If it is not, then suspicion, underfunding,
minute oversight, and capricious additions to workload may become the
equivalent of a constitutional amendment effectively repealing Article rI. 82
76 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 58, at 26.
77 See Gregory B. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical
Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1488-93 (1998); Mark A. Cohen,
Explaining Judicial Behavior or What's "Uncomtitutional" About the Sentencing
Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 185-86 (1991).
78 Burbank, supra note 6, at 323.
79 CHRISTOPHER E. SMrrH, COURTS AND THE POOR 95-96 (1991).
80 Breyer, supra note 8, at 995.
81 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONsTrTuTIONALisM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS
127 (1996).
82 ABA COMM'N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS & JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN




Congress provides the judiciary with plenty of signals regarding its concerns
about trends in decision-making, 83 and wise judges may act with those in mind.
Eugenia Toma has investigated the influence of congressional budgetary
authority on judicial decisions.84 She argues that "the relationship between the
Supreme Court and the Congress is a contractual one" in which they exchange
"budgetary favors" for "politically influenced output."'85 Toma empirically
analyzed the association between Court budgets and judicial outcomes for the
period between 1946 and 1988. The study found that the larger the difference
between the political positions in Court decisions and the Congress, the smaller
the budget increase for the Court. For several chief justices, but not Earl Warren,
the Supreme Court responded to the budgetary signals by shifting its decisional
output in the direction preferred by the legislature.86
Judges' overall responsiveness to Congress has not been extensively
evaluated. Testing judicial independence is possible by examining how courts
decide cases involving the government. Judicial independence is said to take on
"critical significance when the government is one of the parties to a dispute," 87 so
examining these cases may be considered one fair yardstick of the concept.
88
While there is evidence of independence-seen in the flag-burning cases, some
defendants' rights decisions, and the invalidation of RFRA-there is also
empirical evidence of accountability.
It is well established that the Solicitor General, who represents the interests of
the federal government before the Court, "is overwhelmingly successful there." 89
This suggests judicial responsiveness to their parallel branches of government. A
recent study took the database of Supreme Court decisions used by Segal and
others (to demonstrate the ideological independence of the justices) and tested for
the Court's deference to the other institutions of government.90 While the justices'
decisions show a significant ideological determinant, virtually every justice
significantly modified his or her ideology when reviewing an ideologically
contrary decision of another institution.91 A statistical technique called
83 See Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative
Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2593 (1998) ("Congress gives signals by
considering, as well as by enacting, legislation and by holding hearings; members of Congress
speak, both on and off the floor, to judges.").
84 Eugenia F. Toma, A Contractual Model of the Voting Behavior of the Supreme Court:
The Role of the ChiefJustice, 16 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 433 (1996).
85 Id. at 434.
86 Id. at 441-43.
87 Larkins, supra note 9, at 608.
88 See id. at 616 (describing how researchers have measured independence according to
the "frequency by which courts decide cases against the govemment").
89 PERETI, supra note 63, at 149.
90 Cross & Nelson, supra note 49, at 1475.
91 Id. at 1476.
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"proportional reduction in error" enables the testing of whether an additional
variable better explains the outcomes observed. For more than 80% of the
justices, the consideration of institutional deference produced such a reduction in
error.92 Moreover, nearly every justice showed greater deference to statutes or
federal administrative agency decisions than they did to states or lower courts.93
Much of this deference could not be explained by legal requirements, and the
results strongly suggest that the Court tempers its, decisions with concern for other
institutions.
Even the Court's bravest forays into judicial activism have been hedged by
some political concern. The dramatic requirement of school desegregation in
Brown v. Board of Education94 was conditioned by the Court's careful caveat
requiring desegregation to proceed with "deliberate speed."9 5 This condition
defused much of the practical political impact of the ruling.96 It transformed the
opinion from a judicial diktat to something more like a gentle nudge to the
political processes. The courts have also been loathe to address many important
public policy issues, such as the welfare of the poor.97 Such cases and patterns
suggest a measure ofjudicial deference.
There is also considerable evidence that judges are influenced by general
public opinion, either directly or as filtered through the other branches.98 A study
of Supreme Court opinions rendered between 1956 and 1989 concluded that the
Court was "highly responsive to majority opiniorn." 99 Subsequent research found
that judicial "decisions do, in fact, vary in accord with current public
preferences."1 00
When justices agree with public opinion, it does not prove that they are being
directly influenced by public opinion. Judges are drawn from the American public
92 Id. at 1487.
93 Id. at 1481-82.
94 344 U.S. I (1952), rev'd, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
95 Id. at 301.
9 6 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COuRTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 93 (1991). Brown and ancillary court decisions were "ineffective" so long as
"political leadership at the national, state, and local levels was arrayed against civil rights,
making implementation ofjudicial decisions virtually impossible." Id.
97 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 887-
900, 907-08 (2001) (describing how courts, even very liberal courts, have declined to
implement any rights protecting the financial interests of the impoverished).
98See generally LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: Is
PSYCHOLOGY RELEVANT? 58-62 (1999) (summarizing evidence on effect of public opinion).
99 William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REv.
87 (1993).




and may simply share the opinions of the majority. However, judges are hardly
drawn from a random cross-section of the populace, so this correspondence of
attitude is not necessarily the case. It is generally assumed that the elected
branches, Congress and the presidency, represent the will of their constituents.
When their actions correspond to the will of their constituents,this is presumably
evidence of at least some level of responsiveness, and not a simple coincidence of
attitudes. Yet the Supreme Court agrees with public opinion about as often as
does the legislature.'10
There is little direct evidence of the influence of public opinion on the Court,
but there are hints of its relevance. Chief Justice Rehnquist's history of the
Supreme Court suggests that public opinion about our Korean involvement
influenced the outcome of Youngstown Steel.102 Justice Souter's opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey103 expressly declared that the Court must make
"principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled character is
sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation." 10 4 Judges have openly
expressed concern about their public standing. 10 5 Throughout the Court's history,
public opinion has informed and influenced its opinions in some cases. 106
In addition to such direct testimony and case analysis, studies have shown
that unpopular precedents are more likely to be overturned than popular ones.10 7
Other researchers find that the Court's opinions seem to reflect the opinions of all
groups of society, rich and poor, young and old, with varying degrees of
education.108 This is evidence the Court reflects public opinion and not just the
attitudes of its members. Judge Dubois cautioned: "[O]ur courts are not
completely independent. We are not independent of public opinion. If the court
decisions go one way and the country is going another way, we are going to have
a calamity."'' 0 9 Perhaps justices are aware, as Judge Irving Kaufman put it, that a
101 See Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 1529, 1553 (2000) (reviewing studies to this effect); THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC
OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 80 (1989) (finding that the "modem Court appears neither
markedly more nor less consistent with the polls than are other policy makers").
1 0 2 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 95-97
(1987).
103 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
104 Id. at 866.
105 See Cross, supra note 102, at 1556 (noting survey of judges showing concern for their
public relations).
106 See James G. Wilson, The Role of Public Opinion in Constitutional Interpretation,
1993 BYU L. REV. 1037 (reviewing this history).
107 MARSHALL, supra note 102, at 167-85.
108 See Thomas R. Marshall, The Supreme Court and the Grass Roots: Whom Does the
Court Represent Best?, 76 JUDICATURE 22 (1992).
109 Roundtable Discussion, supra note 58, at 21.
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level of public support is needed as the "ultimate justification of their power," l10
or perhaps the justices simply want to be popular.
While there is clear evidence that the Court's decisions are more often than
not consistent with public attitudes, there is a substantial minority of cases where
they are inconsistent, and some decisions are very unpopular.11 A study of
individual rights claims found (a) that the level of public opinion regarding the
claim was a significant determinant of the Court's outcome and (b) that for most
rights the Court was more likely to favor the claim than the public. 12 Public
opinion exerts a pull on the justice but not an insurmountable one. The research
suggests that judges are not "weathervanes," but that public opinion exercises
some effect on decisions at the margin. 13 The Court does not display anything
approaching the slavish devotion to majoritarianism or political preferences that
one might expect from a truly dependent institution.
The judiciary has some institutional protection from complete dependency,
based on public political preferences. The public, as well as the other institutions
of government, desire both an independent judiciary and agreeable ideological
decisions. One federal representative, in connection with legislation limiting pay
increases for justices, declared that the members of the House "want a judiciary
that is independent but not too independent."' 14 Most of the historic efforts to
control the judiciary, such as FDR's Court-packing plan, have been rejected by
the public and their representatives. 15 There are political reasons why political
institutions would desire an independent judiciary, even though it may sometimes
contravene their preferences.1 6 Political parties have an incentive to "pre-comrnmit
110 LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 84 (1998); see also LAWRENCE BAUM,
THE SUPREME COURT 151 (5th ed. 1995)) (reporting that ' justices care about public regard for
the Court, because high regard can help the Court in conflicts with the other branches of
government and increase people's willingness to carry out its decisions").
111 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 109, at 25 (noting that Johnson v. Transportation
Agency was disapproved by a 63% to 29% majority). The same can surely be said of Supreme
Court decisions in other areas, such as defendants' rights, flag-burning and school prayer.
112 Joseph Ignani, The Supreme Court and Public Support for Rights Claims, 78
JUDICATURE 146 (1994).
113 See Roy B. Flemming & B. Dan Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court:
Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCi. 468, 494
(1997).
114 See Toma, supra note 84, at 37.
115 See Friedman, supra note 60, at 759-60 (reporting failures of these efforts). See also
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REviEw 46 (1980)
(noting of FDR that "an immensely popular President riding an immensely popular cause had
his lance badly blunted by his assault on judicial independence").
116 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 885 (1975).
[9jurrent legislature may want judicial interpretations that gut some existing laws, but if it
tries to procure them by forms of coercion that impair the functioning of the judiciary
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to an institutional apparatus" that will enable their decisions to perpetuate over
time. 17 James Rogers suggests that the legislature values judicial independence
for informational reasons and permits some political decision-making, so long as
it is not too great. 18 As Stephen Burbank has put it: 'To yield a little may be
prudent, for the tree that cannot bend to the blast may be broken."'1 19 There is also
a powerful public political constituency for judicial independence 20 but not for
total independence, which could seriously threaten democratic preferences.
Perhaps we can say that the judiciary is "independent at retail, not at
wholesale" 121-making the courts independent in particular cases but not so
independent as to change the fundamental content of the law.122
V. STATE SELECTION SYSTEMS STUDY
The states have a variety of different approaches to selecting judges, and
these approaches have been the source of much discussion. They provide an
excellent laboratory for evaluating the importance of judicial selection systems
and tenure on judicial behavior. One significant concern in choosing among
selection systems is judicial independence. It has been suggested that less
politicized methods of selection, such as the "merit plan" method, provide greater
independence for judges and consequently empower them to more frequently
reverse decisions of the state legislature or executive. 123 Logically, the choice of
across the board, it will impose costs on all who use the courts, including various
politically effective groups and indeed the beneficiaries of whatever legislation the current
legislature has enacted.
Id.; see also J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative
Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUDIES 721 (1994) (exploring economic theories of judicial
independence as applied in Japan and in the United States).
117 Ferejohn, supra note 6, at 374.
118 See James R. Rogers, The Reciprocal Influence of Courts and Legislatures: A
Signaling Model of Judicial Review (April 29, 2000) (unpublished paper presented at the 2000
annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association) (on file with author).
119 Burbank, supra note 6, at 327 (quoting 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN
COMMONWEALTH 273 (3d. ed. 1908)) (alteration in original).
120 See Bator, supra note 4, at 258 (describing judicial independence as "an immensely
powerful political ideal").
121 Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE
AGE OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 273, 280.
122 This retail/wholesale distinction calls into question the propriety of judges striking
down laws as unconstitutional. However, the relative rarity of such action, at least in striking
down federal legislation, suggests that the American judiciary is not committed to a wholesale
overhaul of the nation's laws.
123 See Kenneth L. Karst, A New State Constitution: Of Independent State Grounds and
Independent State Judges, 28 STAN. L. REv. 829, 834-35 (1976) (book review) (suggesting that
judicial activism in California could be attributed to the greater independence of their merit plan
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selection systems should have a material effect on the degree of judicial
independence of the courts.
The effect of judicial selection systems may be identified through studies of
comparative judicial decision-making. To date, most studies have failed to find a
clear correlation between the method of selection and judicial decision-
making. 124 However, it seems implausible that something so significant as
method of selection has no effect on their behavior. The existing studies may have
been looking for an effect in the wrong places.
For purposes of the study, I have broken down state judicial selection
methods into five categories: partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, legislative
appointment, gubernatorial appointment, and merit plan selection. 125 The
approaches seem to present a continuum of politicizing the judiciary in the order
listed-partisan elections obviously link the judiciary to majoritarianism and
party politics, while merit plan selection aims to remove these influences insofar
as possible. Each of the states were placed into one of these five categories.
One measure to test the effect of judicial selection systems is judicial
activism, which should be correlated with judicial independence. A ruling that a
statute is unconstitutional is commonly regarded as a measure of activism, 126 and
likewise a measure of independence, because it substitutes the judicial policy
choice for that passed by the state legislature. My measure of judicial activism
comes from data on the number of statutes declared unconstitutional by courts
between 1981 and 1985.127 The average number of statutes declared
unconstitutional during the period was 11.82. Table 1 displays the relative
frequency of declarations of statutory unconstitutionality by selection method and
selected judiciary); Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best"
Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 16-28 (1995) (contending that the election of judges
provides accountability with little independence).
124 See Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1, 44 (1994) (reporting that studies have generally not found such a correlation);
Jerome 0' Callaghan, Another Test for the Merit Plan, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 477, 477 (1991)
(reviewing literature finding little impact and providing new empirical evidence of little effect
on judicial sentencing decisions).
125 Any such categorization is somewhat arbitrary, as even appointed and merit plan
judges typically must run for reelection. The categorization I have used is a common one,
though, and was drawn from ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
AMERICA 258 (3d. ed. 1996) (data from the American Judicature Society).
126 See, e.g., Baum, supra note 111, at 149-51 (suggesting that the "most prominent type
of activism involves rulings that state statutes are unconstitutional"); Craig E. Emmert, An
Integrated Case-Related Model of Judicial Decision Making: Explaining State Supreme Court
Decisions in Judicial Review Cases, 54 J. POLITICS 543, 544 (1992) (declaring that a "decision
to declare state law unconstitutional is an activist decision because a state supreme court
substitutes its own judgment for that of the legislature").
127 See Henry R. Glick, Policy Making and State Supreme Courts, in THE AMERICAN
COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 100-01 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
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the probability that the group's difference from the average was attributable to
chance.
TABLE I
Selection Methods and Judicial Activism
Number Probability
Partisan Election 13.92 .26
Nonpartisan Election 13.70 .37
Legislative App. 12.25 .90
Gubernatorial App. 11.71 .97
Merit Plan 9.18 .06*
The only statistically significant results were for the merit plan selection
method, which was associated with fewer declarations of unconstitutionality (and
thus less apparent independence). However, the pattern of the results clearly
indicates that judiciaries with greater involvement in politics appear to be
independent and more likely to declare statutes unconstitutional.
The results presented in Table 1 take no account of other variables that might
influence declarations of unconstitutionality and thereby create a spurious
association (or obscure a stronger association). The data show that the number of
constitutional challenges does not differ much by type of state. 128 However, states
with differing selection systems may have other differences that affect the
results.129 I considered the following control variables: the degree of urbanization
of the state ("URBAN"); the degree of interparty competition in elections
("PARCOMP"); the relative level of public participation (turnout) in elections
("PUBPART"); and the relative influence of interest groups before the state
legislature ("INTGRP"). 130
Urbanization was chosen as a control variable because it is the primary
demographic difference between merit plan and other states, and it might relate to
levels of political conflict. The hypothesized direction of this variable is positive,
as such conflict might bring more conflicts before the courts. Interparty
128 See id.
129 See Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of
Judicial Selection Make? Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JUST. SYS. J.
25, 37-39 (1979) (finding that merit plan states tend to have lower than average levels of
urbanization, but little difference in terms of demographic, economic and judicial variables).
130 Data for the relative level of party competition and public participation in elections are
taken from Km QUAILE HILL, DEMOCRACY IN "iIE FIFTY STATES (1994). Data on the relative
influence of interest groups by states comes from Clive S. Thomas & Ronald J. Hrebenar,
Understanding Interest Group Power: Lessons from Developments in the American States
Since the Mid-1980s (April 6, 1995) (paper presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the
Midwest Political Science Association) (on file with author).
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competition was chosen because with lower levels of such competition the
judiciary is more likely to be ideologically aligned with other branches of
government. The hypothesized direction of this variable is negative, both because
of the alignment and because legislatures in one-party states have greater reason
to reduce the institutional independence of the judiciary. 131 Public participation is
a measure of the electorate's interest and involvement and, hence,
majoritarianism. Interest group influence is the converse. The hypothesized
direction of interest group influence is negative (because those groups will act to
preserve their political victories), and the hypothesized direction of public
participation is therefore positive.
I ran separate regressions with the control variables and each of the selection
systems. This enables a test of whether certain selection systems respond
differently to different political contexts. The results are reported in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Determinants of Judicial Activism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
INTGRP -.35* (2.3) -.32* (2.0) -.34* (2.1) -.35* (2.1) -.38* (2.2)
PARCOMIP -.27* (1.8) -.27* (1.8) -.27* (1.8) -.28* (1.8) -.30* (2.0)
PUBPART .24(1.4) .22(1.2) .24 (1.3) .24(1.3) .26 (1.4)
URBANIZ .14 (1.0) .21 (1.3) .24 (1.5) .23(1.4) .21 (1.3)





R_ .26 .22 .20 .20 .20
The results of the multiple regression confirm that merit plan judges are less
likely to find statutes unconstitutional than are those selected through other
methods, even in the presence of significant control variables. The research
reveals much else of interest about judicial decision-making. States with lower
levels of inter-party competition have more statutes declared unconstitutional, as
do states with greater interest group influence. 132 Both these results are contrary
to the predictions that positive political theory would make, but they are very
positive about the role of the judiciary in government. It appears that state judges
131 See Ramseyer, supra note 117, at 746-47 (199,4) (arguing that one-party states have an
incentive to undermine judicial independence).
132 The scale for interest group influence has an inverse direction, so that a negative




are more likely to declare a statute unconstitutional when it is the product of
flawed majoritarianism in the other branches. 133 This may not reflect judges
acting like judges and simply applying the law, but it does suggest that judges are
functioning as a desirable, relatively majoritarian government institution,
deferring less to legislatures that may not reflect the popular will. This is
consistent with a vision that holds that judges should be relatively independent but
not entirely unaccountable.
The preceding analysis and results are very preliminary and require much
additional investigation. 134 Ideally, one would want to examine each of the
judicial declarations of unconstitutionality to determine their nature, whether there
was evidence of ideological or interest group influence (and differential levels of
ideological influence according to a state's selection system), and whether they
were reflecting the true public will in the state or the strength of the legal
reasoning supporting the finding of unconstitutionality. However, it is generally
well accepted that the cases going to the highest courts are close cases in which
both sides can advance reasonably strong cases. 135 It appears that judges selected
by the merit plan method are more responsive to the arguments presented by the
state in these close cases and thus appear somewhat less independent, contrary to
the hypotheses that have been advanced. It also appears that state judges,
whatever the selection system, are acting in a generally wise and valuable fashion,
responding with some independence to majoritarian weaknesses of the other
branches of government.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judicial independence is not an unalloyed good. Just as a bed may be either
too hard or too soft (or just right), judicial independence may be too strong or too
weak (or just right). A balance must be struck between independence and
accountability. While it would be naive to assert that the United States has it "just
right," history suggests that the balance of independence and accountability
currently found in this nation is a pretty good one. However, the fact that our
arrangements for judicial independence are good does not mean that they cannot
133 The association with public participation was not significant, but this may not mean
much because turnout may not be a good proxy for majoritarianism.
134 At least one study is directly contrary to my findings here. A test of state rulings on
public utility regulation found that appointed judges were more independent and activist in
protecting consumers than were elected judges. F. Andrew Hanssen, Appointed Courts, Elected
Courts, and Public Utility Regulation: Judicial Independence and the Energy Crisis, I Bus. &
POL. 179 (1999). This study only contrasted elected and appointed judges, though, and did not
consider differences such as merit plan selection methods.
135 Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251,
285 (1997) (cases reaching the Supreme Court are the hard cases at the margins of the law).
2003]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
be improved.' 36 Louis Michael Seidman stresses that the "various decisions to
limit-or not to limit-the power or independence of judges reflect the desire to
produce different contexts that will yield different outcomes." 137 We must cut
through the fog of rhetorical effluvience on judicial independence and examine
the matter more closely. The important questions are: what sort of systemic
societal outcomes do we wish to advance and what structures of judicial
independence are best suited to their advancement? The answers to these
questions are not well understood.138
While theory is valuable, analysis of appropriate levels of judicial
independence would benefit greatly from empirical analyses. Such research is
needed first to ascertain the determinants of judicial independence. A simple
constitutional declaration that a judiciary is independent is hardly sufficient in
itself to protect that status. More specific protections, such as salary protection,
presumably further independence but may be inadequate in their own right. We
need greater understanding of what institutional features create judicial
independence and that understanding would be enhanced by careful empirical
analyses.
In addition, empirical research is needed to illuminate the consequences and
value of a more independent judiciary. An independent, powerful and
unaccountable judiciary plainly frustrates government action that reflects the will
of the majority of the people. If it does so in furtherance of some higher principle,
such as individual freedom or the rule of law, it may be beneficial for a society.
An independent judiciary may also benefit society by generally slowing down the
pace of political change and allowing more time for democratic reflection.
However, if the independent judiciary only serves to facilitate arbitrary
ideological decision-making, that finding might counsel for less independence.
The effects of judicial independence should also be investigated more broadly.
For example, it would be valuable to know if greater levels of judicial
independence contribute to greater economic growth in a society.139
The comparative empirical study of state courts should prove enlightening.
Differences in selection systems, retention and tenure, and other rules among the
states readily enable testing of their institutional effects on judicial decisions and
136 See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1571, 1572 (1988) (discussing the innate conflict between the goals of judicial independence
and accountability).
137 Id. at 1599.
138 See Russell, supra note 7, at 1. "There is little agreement on just what this condition of
judicial independence is, or on what kind or how much judicial independence is required for a
liberal democratic regime, or on the societal conditions on which judicial independence
depends." Id.
139 For a preliminary discussion of the significance of legal rules and legal institutions on
the economic welfare of nations, see Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L.
REv. 1737 (2002).
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on society more broadly. The differing state judicial systems offer a promising
natural laboratory for investigating judicial independence and other aspects of
court decision-making. Political scientists are actively engaged in research on
state courts and have begun to create large databases to further this study. Legal
academics should participate in this investigation more aggressively.

